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Abstract 
The central concern of this contribution is the question of whether discursively 
stabilised disagreement among experts leads to problems of legitimacy for science 
in its advisory capacity or for the taking of political decisions. In considering this 
question, it seems initially plausible that a failure to build consensus will endanger 
science as an important resource and as a basis of political decision-making. In my 
view, this conclusion is justified in respect of such science and technology contro-
versies which can be understood as problems of risk. Where questions such as 
climate change, cellular radio, or transgenic crops are concerned, debate crystal-
lises around the question of which claims to truth can be shown to be justified, 
and a consensus on the disputed issue between the experts involved is seen as the 
ideal way of ending the conflict (cf. Weingart 2006: 162-3). 
However, I want to argue in this contribution that an absence of consensus cannot 
be understood in principle as a deficit in terms of legitimation, or indeed as a gen-
eral weakness of expert knowledge. On the contrary: to the extent that controver-
sies about science and technology are understood and negotiated as problems of 
ethics rather than risk, disagreement becomes an indicator of quality as politics 
seeks to manage uncertainty. 
In order to demonstrate why ethics is currently such an important factor in con-
flicts about science and technology, I begin (1) by presenting a short discursive 
history of the ebb and flow of ethics during the process of modernisation. It be-
comes clear (2) that many of today’s conflicts about technology are being negoti-
ated with the help of explicit reference to ethics. My main thesis (3) is that from the 
perspective of conflict theory, this appreciation of ethics means disagreement is 
being recognised and stabilised. In ethically framed value conflicts, no-one can – 
with good cause – expect a genuine agreement to be reached on the level of per-
sonal moral reasoning (apart from basic values such as those expressed in the uni-
versal declaration of human rights). The next section (4) shows that this cultivation 
of disagreement has considerable implications for the political management of 
controversies about technology. The empirical analysis is then centrally concerned 
with the question of how politics deals with expert disagreement in ethicised con-
troversies. This analysis is confined to the case of Germany. It shows (5) that po-
litical references to ethics expertise express a recognition of disagreement which 
opens up legitimatory possibilities for political action. In the conclusion (6), I reca-
pitulate the central points of the argument. 
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1 The ups and downs of ethics 
This section deals with ethics as an 
expanding discourse of reflection and 
regulation in the sphere of science and 
technology and with the political im-
plications of this development. The 
issue of ethics as an “ethicisation” of 
technology controversies is therefore 
explored.1 This is the perspective from 
which sociology has reacted to an un-
expected “renaissance of ethics” (Pru-
zan and Thyssen 1994). However, there 
is a need for a more detailed historical 
treatment of the view that ethics has 
been revalued or is undergoing a re-
vival. The following sketch of a sociol-
ogy of ethics is designed to provide 
this treatment. It serves to identify 
clearly the point at which my analysis 
of science and technology controver-
sies makes its intervention in the field, 
and what additional contributions it 
makes. The ebb and flow of ethics in 
the process of modernisation is traced 
via an examination of the works of 
Weber, Gehlen, and Giddens. 
Max Weber emphasised the signifi-
cance of ethics for the development of 
capitalism. In his famous study of 
Protestantism from 1904, Weber re-
constructs in painstaking detail the 
effects of ethical-religious motives on 
the developing practice of capitalist 
logics of action (Weber 1992). The cen-
tral feature of this analysis is the as-
cetic-protestant conception of the call-
                                                       
1 According to Luhmann (1993) and others, 
I understand ethics basically as a way of 
reflecting moral issues along the differen-
tiation between “good” and “bad”. Ethics is 
considered to be a matter of rationality and 
reason in contrast to moral, which is con-
sidered to be a matter of tradition and 
habit. In addition, it may be fruitful to de-
fine the difference between moral and eth-
ics with regard to the expectation of con-
sent and dissent, respectively. In this view 
the rise of ethics, in short, indicates that 
dissent becomes predominant. I will dis-
cuss this point extensively in section 3. In a 
nutshell, ethicisation means that the main 
discursive frame in a technology contro-
versy is ethics rather than risk, see section 
2. 
ing, in which work is treated as a 
moral test of the individual. In order to 
establish itself successfully, this imbu-
ing of work with moral content re-
quired religious motives in the form of 
the Calvinist doctrine of predestina-
tion, according to which untiring pro-
fessional work is the best way for indi-
viduals to reassure themselves that 
they are in a state of grace. For protes-
tant ethics, work is no longer a neces-
sary evil; it becomes a duty which re-
quires a systematic method according 
to which life is to be lived. In the final 
analysis, work becomes largely a mat-
ter of working on oneself; the puritani-
cal work ethics appears as an early 
form of modern “technologies of the 
self” (Foucault 1988). It denies the 
worker any respite from his drudgery 
and does not allow the entrepreneur to 
consume his wealth. One could de-
scribe this kind of ethically motivated 
establishing of a morality of work as 
the cultural conditions in which mod-
ern capitalism can develop. What 
makes Weber’s account so striking is 
his description of the way in which 
actors become accustomed to the 
practices of capitalism as an unin-
tended consequence of efforts directed 
towards ethical reform. Weber sees 
very clearly that in developed capital-
ism there is no longer any need for this 
kind of religiously-charged conception 
of professional work. Before long, the 
protestant work ethic only continues 
to exist in a secularised form, for ex-
ample in 18th-century utilitarianism. 
Once capitalism has become estab-
lished, it emancipates itself from its 
religious foundations. 
Arnold Gehlen, in his classic study of 
Man in the age of technology (pub-
lished 1957 in German language), also 
addressed the relationship between 
ethics and capitalism. Gehlen exam-
ines this question against the back-
ground of developed postwar capital-
ism (Fordism). He portrays modern 
industrial society as a form of society 
that systematically seals itself off from 
ethical questions (Gehlen 1980). 
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Gehlen’s diagnosis of contemporary 
society can thus be read as a thesis 
about the loss of the function of ethics, 
and he argues that there are both (a) 
material and (b) structural reasons 
why this has happened. 
(a) In material terms, Gehlen sees a 
connection between this loss of func-
tion and the institutional progress for 
which he uses the term “superstruc-
ture”. This progress is based on scien-
tific-technical developments, organ-
ised by the state, and supported by 
industry. It leads to a linear rise in the 
general standard of living, and there 
no longer seem to be any natural limits 
to this. Once the belief in the possibil-
ity of unlimited growth has become 
established, ethical imperatives that 
might serve to set limits (“asceticism”) 
carry less and less conviction. Why 
should there be any limits to what re-
search can be allowed to do when it is 
the source of the general improvement 
in the quality of life? Why should the 
individual behave ascetically when 
everything is available in excessive 
quantities?2 
(b) Gehlen’s second point is that ethics 
no longer has any role to play because 
the rationalisation process leads to the 
development of functional spheres 
operating according to their own laws, 
and these spheres are no longer sig-
nificantly structured by personal rela-
tionships. Modern societies have been 
differentiated into a variety of spheres 
of action with their own logics, and for 
this very reason they offer no target 
towards which ethics could be di-
rected. Science is an example of this. 
                                                       
2 The only sphere in which Gehlen sees 
ethics as having any role to play is in cul-
tural and intellectual circles where indi-
viduals are looking for ways to surpass 
themselves by means of voluntary asceti-
cism. Indeed, the formulation of ethical 
demands as demands on the self is the 
criterion Gehlen uses to identify elites. In 
this respect, the loss of function he attrib-
utes to ethics is an indicator of cultural 
decline in the sense of the loss of individu-
ality (“Vermassung”). 
Gehlen argues that research in the 
natural sciences cannot be ethically 
regulated because its experimental 
epistemological logic leads to an 
automatism: relevant research ques-
tions are formulated on the basis of 
scientific progress (what is already 
known), not by the researcher (as a 
moral subject). This also applies in 
principle to the economy, politics, and 
the law. Weber’s suspicion that ad-
vanced capitalism no longer needs 
ethics is thus given a more radical 
twist by Gehlen. As far as the goals of 
governance and regulation are con-
cerned ethics is not just superfluous, 
but inadmissible as a matter of princi-
ple. 
Anthony Giddens has coined the con-
cept of life politics, and uses it to put 
forward the thesis that ethics has been 
rediscovered during the process of 
reflexive modernisation (Giddens 1991: 
209-31). In today’s conditions, a new 
type of politics is emerging to replace 
the traditional politics aligned with 
predefined class interests and ideals of 
emancipation. The new politics, argues 
Giddens, is shaped by the fundamental 
question of the good life (for all). This 
life politics is strictly individual, and is 
based on ethical-moral rather than 
theoretical-ideological reflection. Gid-
dens sees the environmental move-
ment, and especially the women’s 
movement, as forerunners of this kind 
of ethicised politics. It is true that the 
political demands put forward by these 
movements are not determined by a 
specific ethical programme. However, 
the specifically ethical aspect of this 
life politics arises from the politicisa-
tion of spheres that are normally con-
sidered to have more to do with values 
than with interests. Decisions about 
reproduction are the best example of 
this. This sphere can serve as a typical 
example of an area in which questions 
which are no longer subject to tradi-
tional routines have been opened up to 
individual decisions (about values) in 
the course of modernisation. Giddens’ 
concept of life politics may be rather 
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vague, and it has weaknesses as a way 
of drawing distinctions. Nevertheless, 
there is no doubt about the value of 
his insight that ethics is becoming 
more significant as a major point of 
reference for political action in a pe-
riod in which the problems of class 
and interests generated by industrial 
society are becoming less important 
and processes of individualisation and 
the retreat of the state are becoming 
more prominent. 
Nikolas Rose has put forward the con-
cept of ethopolitics, and in doing so 
has suggested a more precise way of 
grasping this aspect of political change 
(Rose 2001). For Rose, ethopolitics is a 
modernised or democratised form of 
biopolitics, in which biopolitical opti-
misation is realised not through state 
commands and control by experts but 
rather via a kind of individual self-
optimisation which employs a variety 
of technologies of the self. One way in 
which this asserts itself is via a radi-
cally modernised and individualised 
discourse of risk. Unlike eugenics and 
ideas of racial hygiene, which treated 
certain stigmatised groups as dangers 
to the fitness of the population, mod-
ern genetics identifies the individual as 
the potential bearer of risks. This also 
means, though, that individuals who 
are aware of their own genetic risk 
factors are required to take precau-
tions in managing their lives. Instead 
of (compulsory) state measures to im-
prove the biological quality of the 
population, the individual is now ex-
pected to be constantly making an 
effort to shape his/her genetic “fate” by 
means of checks and precautionary 
measures. In this way, what could be 
described as a puritan ethics of the 
body becomes established, a certain 
“asceticism” of biopolitical behaviour, 
the goal of which is to regulate the 
body in an optimal way. This does not 
necessarily mean taking part in com-
petitive sport, far from it; it does, 
though, mean controlled enjoyment 
which takes specific risk factors into 
consideration.3 Ethopolitics therefore 
describes a subjectification of biopoli-
tics, at the centre of which is a bodily 
ethics aligned with medical-genetic 
discourses of risk. This concept is 
similar to Giddens’; the main form 
taken by ethics is an individual one, 
i.e. it manifests itself as an individual 
regime of checks and regulation. 
My short excursion to the sociology of 
ethics has revealed that – in spite of all 
differences regarding their historical 
background and their theoretical per-
spective – the authors referred to have 
one major point in common: they all 
are interested in ethics as a way of 
shaping life-world practices, as a form 
of informing and (self-)controlling so-
cial action. However, the significance 
of ethics today is by no means limited 
to forms of individual biopolitics. Fo-
cusing on ethics as being relevant for 
the individual is no longer sufficient. 
Already Giddens stated that ethical and 
moral categories have become politi-
cally relevant. Today, they are part of 
many governance discourses, in par-
ticular those where technology conflict 
management is of importance. 
As Jürgen Mittelstraß observed at the 
beginning of the 1990s, it is impossible 
to overlook the general trend towards 
ethics (Mittelstraß 1992: 195). This 
means that ethics has now become a 
major criterion of reflection and le-
gitimation in many different spheres of 
society. Let us take, for example, the 
economy. Nico Stehr (2007) has re-
cently spoken of a “moralisation of the 
markets”. Even though this should not 
be taken too literally, one can hardly 
deny that there has been a certain 
ethicising of individual decisions about 
what to buy or that businesses are 
basing their strategies on this devel-
opment (see Moorstedt 2007). Super-
markets advertise the fact that they sell 
“fair trade” bananas, and banks set up 
                                                       
3 This is precisely the context in which the 
problem perceptions that have in recent 
years been discussed in connection with 
the concept of obesity become relevant. 
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ethical investment funds. Ethical cate-
gories are just as relevant in politics. 
The enemy-image rhetoric of the likes 
of George W. Bush (“the axis of evil”, 
“rogue states”) provides tangible evi-
dence of what one could describe as a 
moralisation of politics: the construc-
tion of political opposition no longer 
takes place along the coordinates of 
left/right or above/below, but rather, as 
has been emphasised by the political 
scientist Chantal Mouffe (2005), in the 
ethical-moral categories of “good” and 
“evil”. 
If one also takes into account the es-
tablishment and professionalisation of 
special fields of applied ethics such as 
sport ethics, environmental ethics, and 
media ethics, it becomes clear that 
ethics has now filtered into almost all 
spheres of society. Ethics is no longer 
just an academic discipline and part of 
the scholarly world; it has developed 
well beyond these narrow limits. We 
now come across ethics in places 
where no-one would have thought of 
looking for it a short while ago. FIFA, 
the governing body of world football, 
has an ethics commission since 2006. 
Against this background, one could 
argue that we are not simply observing 
a renaissance of ethics, but are wit-
nessing both an institutional differen-
tiation and a debordering of discourses 
about ethics. 
2 Framing technology controver-
sies 
We also encounter ethics on the broad 
terrain of technology controversies. 
Today, many conflicts about technol-
ogy are conducted with explicit refer-
ence to ethics and morality, rather 
than exclusively or primarily in terms 
of risk – as was the case for many of 
the discussions and debates about 
large-scale technologies from the 
1960s onwards. In the recent past, 
controversies about the development 
of science and technology have be-
come increasingly “ethicised” (Lindsey 
et al. 2001). In particular, ethics has 
become the main criterion of reflec-
tion, justification, and legitimation in 
controversies about biomedicine. In 
other words: ethics provides the domi-
nant frame. However, “framing” has 
for some time now been a conceptu-
ally unspecific and overused term; 
there is therefore a need to be rather 
more precise when using it (see Dahin-
den 2006). I use the term “frames” to 
mean powerful organisational princi-
ples of interaction. The function of 
frames is to create a shared discursive 
basis on which conflicts can be con-
ducted. The concept of frames there-
fore belongs to a level above that of 
the concrete arguments, objectives, 
and narratives that appear in the dis-
cussions themselves. In this sense, 
frames are principles which provide 
criteria of relevance and structures of 
orientation; they establish the relevant 
perspective that guide the discussion 
and determine the fundamental rules 
of the discourse to be conducted. At 
the level of concrete evaluation, frames 
do not anticipate any particular out-
come. 
This last point needs to be stressed, 
because frames are often associated 
with concrete, opposed positions in 
the political debate being conducted.4 
This conception fails to take account 
of Georg Simmel’s insight that con-
flicts need shared criteria of relevance 
if they are to be conducted at all 
(Simmel 1958). Without shared frames, 
there is indifference rather than dis-
agreement. In the development of con-
troversies, therefore, it is the shared 
frames that are crucial rather than just 
the normative differences – and one 
could perhaps even say that the shared 
frames are much more important. 
                                                       
4 This is particularly noticeable in political 
science, as you can see for example in the 
influential study of Schön and Rein (1994). 
This strongly normative component in the 
concept of the frame has been precisely 
formulated in Entman’s (1993) definition of 
frame functions: frames define problems in 
a certain specific way, establish causal 
relations, anticipate evaluations, and pro-
vide guidance for action. 
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Only when we consider the question 
from this perspective are we able to 
appreciate the latent power effects of 
frames. On the one hand, frames direct 
and structure our habits of seeing, 
thinking, and acting; on the other 
hand, they determine controversies to 
the extent that adversaries must refer 
in a constructive way to established 
frames. If and when one frame be-
comes dominant, powerful rules for 
the organisation of conflict communi-
cation establish themselves. In the 
case of controversies about biomedi-
cine, this means that politicians and 
researchers who are in favour of stem 
cell research cannot simply put for-
ward economic arguments; they al-
ways need to offer an additional ethi-
cal argument. Advancing therapeutic 
promises has become very popular as 
a way of doing this (Rubin 2008). In 
the present context, then, ethicising 
means that questions relating to sci-
ence and technology policy are under-
stood as questions of ethics; the dis-
course of ethics, in the sense of its 
categories and concepts, is recognised 
as a legitimate form in which conflicts 
can be conducted and as the basis of 
conflict regulation. 
The ethics frame refers to the funda-
mental distinction of “morally good” 
and “bad”. Categories of (economic) 
usefulness and (scientific) truth, re-
spectively, are not irrelevant in ethi-
cised controversies but do not play an 
important role. However, one could 
argue that “moral frame” was a better 
term for describing the current contro-
versies about science and technology. 
Why talk about ethics when, at best, 
the academic discipline of ethics pro-
vides the keywords for the public de-
bates only? To give an answer, we 
should bear in mind that the term eth-
ics as used here does not necessarily 
indicate elaborated philosophical ap-
proaches; rather, ethics is understood 
as a way of reflecting moral issues (but 
not necessarily according to discipli-
nary standards). Furthermore, the no-
tion of moral does not correspond to 
the way how current technology con-
troversies are negotiated. Moral is 
closely connected to the ideals of un-
ambiguousness and truth as well as to 
the expectation of consent. “Moral-
ised” controversies are associated with 
outrage, emotions and (often militant) 
protest; they are close to “wars on 
truth” and provide little space for 
compromises for politics. Ethicisation, 
instead, indicates that expectations of 
disagreement get predominant. Ethi-
cised controversies, in principle, are 
open to building temporary compro-
mises, to deliberation and participa-
tion of the many. This fundamental 
change becomes obvious when regard-
ing the governance of technology con-
flicts, as I will show in section 4. 
The ethics frame contains many possi-
ble framings of addressing issues in 
ethical terms, i.e. sub-frames. In dis-
cussions on research involving em-
bryos, e.g. the frame of the “moral 
status” has been dominant within the 
ethics frame. Respect for autonomy, 
human dignity or beneficence are 
other sub-frames which are effective in 
current debates (though often in popu-
larised versions of the original phi-
losophical formulations). 
It is not inevitable that science and 
technology controversies will take the 
form of ethical debates. Let us take, for 
example, agricultural biotechnology. In 
the debate about genetically modified 
crops, the argument is not about what 
is morally permissible but about what 
we know and do not know. The central 
question is: how great is the risk aris-
ing from an intervention in nature? 
What ecological dangers and dangers 
to human health result from the at-
tempt to use genetic engineering to 
make plants resistant to pests? Agri-
biotechnology is treated in the first 
instance as a problem of risk rather 
than ethics. The arguments here re-
volve around claims about security and 
assessments of risk, not views about 
the value of life. 
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The cases of agri-biotechnology and 
nanotechnology indicate that ques-
tions of risk are still salient, and this is 
so in ethicised controversies as well. 
Examples are the risk of egg donation 
for purposes of assisted reproduction 
or of biomedical research in general. 
However, in ethicised controversies 
such questions are negotiated within 
the broader context of what is deemed 
morally good or bad. That is, biomedi-
cine, above all, is treated in the first 
instance as a problem of ethics. 
Of course, criticism of agri-
biotechnology involves not only alter-
native calculations of risk but also 
quite different attitudes to values, for 
example an alternative understanding 
of nature (Gill 2003). But the dominant 
expert discourse was and is still 
framed predominantly as a conflict 
about knowledge. The participatory 
technology assessment relating to her-
bicide resistance which was organised 
by the Social Science Research Centre 
Berlin in the 1990s was a good exam-
ple of this (van den Daele et al. 1996). 
Conflicting truth claims were at the 
heart of the exchanges between ex-
perts and counter-experts in this in-
stance, and normative principles were 
not at issue (van den Daele 2001: 10). 
There were similar exchanges over 
claims to be in possession of the truth 
in the case of nuclear energy. This 
conflict was (and is still) shaped by the 
assumption that decisions about the 
reliability of assumptions of causality 
and predictions concerning danger can 
(and must) be taken on the basis of 
scientific expertise and the use of sci-
entific method. These controversies 
about risk therefore revolve around the 
quality of knowledge. 
3 The legitimacy of irresolvable 
disagreement 
If ethics has become the main way of 
framing technology controversies, 
what are the implications for govern-
ance? In my view, the rise of ethics 
indicates that there has been a change 
in legitimacy of disagreement. When 
conflicts are ethicised, the status of 
disagreement changes in a fundamen-
tal way: dissent is now – in principle – 
considered legitimate, and, above all, it 
is considered legitimate in a perma-
nent form. The political function of the 
ethics frame is thus to be found in the 
way it stabilises and legitimises ir-
resolvable disagreement. And of 
course, the reverse also applies: the 
status of disagreement is also consti-
tutive of the stabilisation of a specific 
conflict frame – if the status of this 
value changes, so does the frame. In 
this respect, ethics as a conflict frame 
can be understood as an expression of 
the legitimacy of irresolvable dissent. 
Returning again to the case of risk 
controversies makes this clear. 
Needless to say, experts engaged in 
risk controversies can and do also 
disagree with each other. In these 
cases, though, the expectation of con-
sensus remains stable as a counterfac-
tual ideal. One can see this in the dis-
pute about transgenic crops, a contro-
versy that is still on-going (Ham-
pel/Torgersen 2010). The European 
Union permitted the cultivation of the 
genetically modified maize varieties 
MON810 and T25, but the EU’s direc-
tive 2001/18/EC made it possible for 
member states to register scientific 
objections and on this basis to ban the 
cultivation of these varieties.5 In other 
words, the possibility of a policy based 
on counter-expertise is opened up; 
because the latent consensus ideal 
retains its force, arguments put foward 
by a different expert can always post-
pone a final decision. If in risk contro-
versies the expectation that a consen-
                                                       
5 France, Greece, Austria, and Hungary 
rejected the EU legislation and passed their 
own laws prohibiting the cultivation of 
these crops. The EU tried repeatedly to get 
these national laws repealed, but was 
never able to obtain the necessary two-
thirds majority in the Council of Ministers. 
In 2008, pressure from the EU forced Aus-
tria to lift its ban on the import of trans-
genic crops, but the ban on their cultiva-
tion remained in force (Abbott 2009). 
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sus will be reached does not persist, 
the strategy of the counter-expertise 
would have no chance to succeed; and 
the dispute would not be conducted 
with such tenacity and without any 
real prospect that a scientific solution 
will be found. Thus, the belief in con-
sensus turns out to be a counterfactual 
assumption. 
This means that in risk controversies, 
disagreement can only be considered a 
temporary anomaly which can be cor-
rected by means of greater objectivity. 
Disagreement is only legitimate when 
it is temporary, i.e. when it takes the 
form of a mistake. Scientists are com-
mitted to logical-analytical procedures 
(e.g. experiments, modelling) which 
they believe will, if employed correctly, 
lead to answers that cannot be chal-
lenged. As Collingridge pointed out 
some time ago (1981: 189), risk con-
flicts are, like “normal” scientific de-
bates, essentially debates about truth; 
consequently, the ideals of unambigu-
ity and consensus guide action, even if 
these ideals will always remain out of 
reach. This ideal provides politics with 
specific options, as one can see in the 
case of agri-biotechnology: more wide-
ranging research is financed, addi-
tional disciplines are taken into ac-
count, and in sum the process of sci-
entification is advancing. All this can 
legitimise a political strategy of post-
poning a final decision. The post-
ponement sends a signal: we need to 
carry on gathering knowledge until we 
can take a decision that is genuinely 
knowledge-based. This became clear 
recently in the case of the prolonged 
EU’s moratorium on permission to 
cultivate genetically modifed crops. By 
way of contrast, it is hard to imagine a 
moratorium on disputed questions of 
bioethics – not because there is objec-
tively greater pressure to address this 
problem and so to take decisions, but 
because the expectations are different. 
To avoid misunderstandings: in paral-
lelising risk and (scientific) knowledge 
conflicts I refer to the mainstream dis-
course in which risk is taken as an 
objective and calculable fact. This is 
what sociologists would call the tech-
nocratic term of risk. In contrast, they 
keep stressing that risk is implicitly 
value-laden and socially constructed. 
In fact, in the above-mentioned risk 
controversies the normative aspect 
usually does not come to the fore and 
if so, we can assume that ethicising is 
going on. Take for example the pre-
cautionary principle as established by 
the EU, which can be understood as a 
policy element indicating the transition 
from a risk to an ethics frame. 
In ethicised technology conflicts, the 
ideals of unambigousness and consen-
sus are abandoned. Ethicised problems 
cannot be solved by calling on expert 
knowledge, since it is perfectly evident 
that the experts are no more in agree-
ment on ethical questions than is soci-
ety as a whole. Ethicisation implies the 
societal expectation that expert knowl-
edge, formalised procedures, and so 
on will not be able to provide the basis 
for an unambiguous and clearly pref-
erable solution to a given problem. 
And there is absolutely no doubt about 
this. In this frame, there is no longer 
even the counterfactual ideal of a deci-
sion that will be seen by all concerned 
as the best option. Of course, ethical 
conflicts also involve disputes about 
the plausibility of individual points of 
view. The predominance of dissent 
within ethicised controversies, as al-
ready mentioned, does not mean that 
disputes are abandoned. In fact, the 
opponents keep debating, and these 
debates are necessary to draw the 
boundaries, to determine the canon of 
legitimate arguments, and in doing so 
to establish a well-ordered range of 
acceptable positions. Out of these de-
bates politically inspired comprises 
may arise that sometimes lead to a 
shared recommendation of an ethics 
council. In other words, despite of 
irreconcilable positions a shared view 
on practical problems may be arrived 
at. Nevertheless, the quality of consent 
is different. Unlike discussions about 
interests or risks, participants ac-
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knowledge rather than simply take 
note of fundamental disagreement on 
the level of values. This means that 
although there will be lively exchanges 
about ethical questions in expert bod-
ies (such as national ethics councils), 
no-one expects these effort to lead to a 
value-based consensus. In contrast, in 
the case of a risk controversy partici-
pants have to agree on a shared per-
ception of the significance of a risk 
involved. 
The decisive point here is not the fact 
that different people give different an-
swers to the same question (i.e. dis-
agreement as such); the more impor-
tant element is the specific form in 
which expertise is institutionalised, 
which always already expresses the 
attribution of a certain validity status 
to disagreement. The experts working 
on questions of risk live and work, in 
principle, in accordance with the clas-
sic-modern ideal of the scholarly 
search for truth. The expert council, on 
the other hand, which is made up of 
people from different disciplinary 
backgrounds and with different world-
views, expresses the consciousness of 
relativity that is an integral part of eth-
ics. The political task of these councils 
cannot therefore be anything more 
than the coordination of disagreement; 
they cannot overcome disagreement. 
Against this background, the rise and 
expansion of ethics (“ethicisation”) can 
be read as the expression of a change 
in expectations of what science can do. 
Science is a major resource for reflec-
tion and justification in many spheres 
of society, but today it cannot lay claim 
to any monopoly on rationality (for 
early evidence of this, see Bonß/Hart-
mann 1985). This ambivalence may be 
a precondition of the way in which 
disagreement among experts no longer 
emerges inadvertently via studies and 
expert reports that come to different 
conclusions (in the case of risk), but 
can be publicly presented in a coordi-
nated way (ethics). From this perspec-
tive, ethics would be a medium in 
which the contradiction between ad-
vancing scientification and generalised 
scepticism about science can be pre-
sented and negotiated, even if it can-
not be resolved. In fact, in ethicised 
technology conflicts the significance of 
knowledge is not a matter of dispute 
(as a basis for normative positions); at 
the same time, the opinion of each 
individual counts as an opinion. 
4 Ethicisation and technology 
governance 
If ethics is now the main semantics of 
governance, what are the conse-
quences for technology governance? 
This question can be opened up to 
reveal the expectation that the gener-
alised obligation to refer in a construc-
tive way to ethics makes a difference 
for technology governance. In this 
section, I use empirical material to 
show that this suspicion is justified. 
This material indicates that ethicisa-
tion is associated with changes in ex-
pectations which affect both politics 
and science in its advisory capacity. 
4.1 Proceduralisation and participa-
tion 
Bioethical questions have to be settled 
against the background of a stable 
pluralism of values in society. For this 
reason, the quality of the procedures 
employed in decisionmaking is crucial; 
discourse, as an open-ended process, 
is seen as the basis of a rational man-
agement of disagreement. In order for 
political decisions to remain valid for a 
reasonable period of time, all the com-
peting groups must feel that they have 
been heard and their positions recog-
nised, since it is in any case impossible 
for the substance of the solution 
adopted to convince everyone (and 
everyone knows this in advance). Con-
flicts about values cannot be solved by 
science. In conflicts where the main 
dispute is over the correct assessment 
of risk, one can hope that one day the 
right experiment will be developed and 
this will make it possible to test the 
different claims made to have provided 
the correct explanation, so that unsat-
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isfactory disagreements can be over-
come. Where ethical questions are 
concerned, though, disagreement is 
endemic. This explains the greater 
value attached to procedures as a 
source of legitimation. 
In the context of bioethical value con-
flicts, we can therefore observe almost 
desperate attempts to get the silent or 
uninterested public to participate in 
this discourse.6 So-called citizens’ 
conferences, experiments with the 
involvement of laypersons such as we 
are now seeing more frequently in the 
sphere of biomedicine (Abels/Bora 
2004), are procedures which are sup-
posed to bring members of the silent 
majority into the discourse. This is 
something different from a method 
designed to canalise an explicitly for-
mulated political demand to be al-
lowed to participate. Lay participation 
typically materialises in the form of a 
laboratory experiment at present 
(Bogner 2010). That is, lay participa-
tion as currently organized by profes-
sional participation experts under con-
trolled conditions rarely is linked to 
public controversies, to the pursuit of 
political participation or to individual 
concerns. 
Bioethical controversies take place in 
the features sections of the newspa-
pers, in discussions conducted be-
tween intellectuals, and at confer-
ences, but not on the barricades. These 
controversies tend to start in discus-
sions between experts rather than in 
criticism voiced by groups in civil soci-
ety which then attracts public atten-
tion. Two examples of this are the de-
bate about stem cell research, which 
was set off by the research proposal 
Oliver Brüstle submitted to the Ger-
man Research Foundation (DFG) in 
2001, and the German euthanasia de-
                                                       
6 In bioethical value conflicts, we thus see 
the largely indifferent pluralism which 
Vilhelm Aubert (1961: 31-32) describes as 
one course that can be taken by the con-
flict; the other possibility is that it takes an 
aggressive form. 
bate, which started with Peter Singer’s 
book Practical Ethics. When groups 
from civil society become involved, 
they do not do so as pressure groups; 
they are bodies organising a public 
discourse which is consciously seen as 
open-ended. One recalls, for example, 
the “1000 questions” project launched 
by the “Aktion Mensch” organisation 
(Klein et al. 2009). 
4.2 The subjectification of political 
rationality 
It seems to be the case that it is diffi-
cult for bioethical questions to be 
transformed into traditional questions 
related to party-political interests. Bio-
ethical questions occupy a position 
beyond left and right on the political 
spectrum. This became clear once 
again in the spring of 2008 during the 
debates that took place in the German 
Bundestag about the liberalisation of 
the law on stem cell research. On this 
question, Christian-Social pro-life MPs 
joined forces with Green feminists to 
argue against liberalisation, and Chris-
tian-Social MPs in favour of this re-
search entered into an informal alli-
ance with some Social Democrats to 
argue in favour of liberalisation. Every 
party was split on the issue. Inciden-
tally, we can observe political parties 
dealing with this problem of order in 
an active way where questions of eth-
ics are concerned. 
In the context of the strain this puts on 
the political order, one can observe a 
subjectification of the rationality of 
political decisionmaking: when impor-
tant decisions have to be taken, politi-
cal action is shifted into the sphere of 
individual decisions about values. In 
debates about embryo research, in 
particular, it has repeatedly been em-
phasised that MPs or governments 
have to make “personal” evaluations, 
or to “take a decision as a matter of 
conscience”. Subjectivity and authen-
ticity, not party discipline or rational 
arguments put forward by experts, 
provide the justification for a political 
vote. A good example of a politician 
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expressing this view (though there are 
many similar ones that could be re-
ferred to) can be found in an interview 
given by Herta Däubler-Gmelin, the 
former Minister of Justice, to the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 
“The basic questions about the place of the 
individual in biomedicine, and this does 
not happen very often, are genuine matters 
of conscience on which every MP has to 
make up his or her own mind, without any 
instructions from the parliamentary frac-
tion.” (Bahnen et al. 2002) 
In Germany, the 2002 debates about 
the German stem cell research law, in 
which MPs spoke and voted on their 
own behalf without needing to follow 
party discipline, are still considered to 
be one of the Bundestag’s finest hours. 
By way of contrast, anyone who is 
reluctant to treat parliamentary votes 
on legislation of relevance to bioethics 
as occasions when MPs can decide 
according to their conscience is likely 
to be the target of fierce criticism – 
both from the opposition and from 
their own side. The British Prime Min-
ister, Gordon Brown, experienced this 
in the negotiations on the new British 
embryo research law. At first, Brown 
categorically rejected demands that 
members of the government should be 
free to vote according to their con-
science, arguing that this was a piece 
of legislation of fundamental impor-
tance for research policy. After a series 
of public protests, he was forced to 
allow a free vote without party disci-
pline on at least some parts of the leg-
islation (BBC News, 25.03.2008). 
4.3 Changing forms of expertise 
In the complicated sphere of biomedi-
cal research and the application of the 
resulting technologies, politicians have 
no alternative but to inform them-
selves about the issues at stake. After 
all, there is a grave danger of legitima-
tion deficits in hierarchical and politi-
cally centralised knowledge and deci-
sion procedures. In the case of stabi-
lised disagreement, the quality of the 
collective development of an informed 
opinion is now more dependent than 
before on the quality of the knowledge 
that contributes to this process (Willke 
2005: 48). In relation to current tech-
nology controversies, it is not really 
the experiments in participation de-
scribed above that have become politi-
cally relevant; the more significant 
development is the role being played 
by new forms of expert-based policy 
advice, forms which involve a con-
structive reference to ethics in their 
own understanding of themselves, the 
political tasks they are asked to per-
form, and the names given to these 
bodies. They can thus be seen as eth-
ics-frame-specific forms of expertise.7  
In recent years, we have seen interdis-
ciplinary expert bodies being set up in 
a number of western democracies un-
der the designation “National Bio-
ethics Council” (Fuchs 2005). In Aus-
tria, a council of this type was set up 
and attached to the Federal Chancel-
lery in 2001; in Switzerland, the Fed-
eral Council established a National 
Ethics Council in the same year; and in 
Germany, the then Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder also set up an National Eth-
ics Council in 2001. Additionally, from 
2000 to 2005 there were two Commis-
sions of the German Bundestag in ex-
istence (called “Study Commission on 
Law and Ethics in Modern Medicine”) 
which consisted of 13 members of the 
Bundestag and 13 experts. At the out-
set there was tension between these 
two different types of ethics commis-
sions. At the end of 2007, the National 
Ethics Council was given a legal basis 
and renamed the German Ethics Coun-
cil. A common feature of these bodies 
                                                       
7 In accordance with this understanding of 
the field, the German Federal Environment 
Agency (UBA), the Robert Koch Institute, 
and the Central Commission for Biological 
Safety are among the bodies producing 
risk-frame-specific expertise. Technology 
Assessment (TA) is also an institutional 
consequence of risk conflicts; it bears wit-
ness to the fact that in early risk conflicts, 
knowledge that was of better quality, or 
more relevant to the problem at hand (in-
terdisciplinarity), was seen as the best way 
of solving conflicts. 
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is the broad range of different disci-
plines and worldviews represented 
among their members.  
Needless to say, calling on expert 
knowledge is a traditional instrument 
to which politicians turn when they 
need to justify and legitimise deci-
sions. However, what is happening 
now does not just have to do with 
questions of knowledge; as we have 
seen, questions of values are now in-
volved. The new element is the explicit 
labelling of expertise as “expertise 
about values”. In addition, this exper-
tise must be negotiated within a het-
erogeneous team. After all, in the na-
tional ethics councils Catholics and 
atheists, geneticists and representa-
tives of disabled people’s organisa-
tions, and representatives of all sorts 
of different positions are sitting down 
together around the table. What we 
have here is a case of institutionalised 
counter-expertise (whatever one’s own 
position may be, someone who takes 
the opposite view will always be pre-
sent in the plenum), and there is 
hardly any way one individual can 
claim to be in possession of authorita-
tive knowledge. The ethics experts are 
seen as people who can convey points 
of view and ways in which issues can 
be interpreted, and this is also how 
they see themselves (Bogner et al. 
2008). The logical consequence is that 
ethics councils do not really see them-
selves as political actors; their main 
function, as they see it, is the prepara-
tion and systematisation of knowl-
edge. In some unusual cases, these 
expert bodies do not provide politi-
cians with any policy recommenda-
tions at all (even diverging ones); the 
US President’s Council on Bioethics, 
for example, restricted its conclusions 
on stem cell research and cloning to a 
differentiated systematic treatment of 
ethical positions, and did not go on to 
derive any recommendations for politi-
cal action from this analysis. And even 
the ethics councils that do draw up 
policy options, for example those in 
German-speaking countries, are inter-
nally split – at least with regard to the 
“big” bioethical issues such as stem 
cell research or genetic testing. So they 
usually produce coordinated dis-
agreement in the form of between two 
and four divergent recommendations. 
The next question is: if expertise deliv-
ers a bundle of contending opinions, 
with arguments to back them up, 
rather than consensus, what are the 
consequences for political action? How 
do politicians deal with expert dissent? 
5 How politics deals with dis-
agreement among experts 
We can only analyse the way politi-
cians deal with disagreement among 
experts by looking at what politicians 
say when they refer explicitly to ethics 
expertise. For methodological reasons, 
it is almost impossible to measure 
anything like the actual “impact” of 
expertise on the political system. There 
is hardly any way of telling how the 
German Chancellor reacts when she 
reads the latest statement of the Ger-
man Ethics Council. We can, though, 
analyse the form taken by politicians’ 
references to ethics expertise. If we 
proceed in this manner, we have a 
sounder empirical basis on which to 
address the question of the actual la-
tent functions of ethics expertise for 
politics. 
The following microscopy of political 
utilisation of ethics expertise is limited 
in substance to the biomedical issues 
that have attracted public attention 
(stem cell research, cloning, preim-
plantation genetic diagnosis [PGD]), 
and the covers the 2000-2008 period. 
The relevant advisory bodies are, as 
mentioned above, the National Ethics 
Council and the German Bundestag’s 
Study Commission on Law and Ethics 
in Modern Medicine. The documents 
consulted were: press releases issued 
by members of the German 
Bundestag;8 important parliamentary 
                                                       
8 Press releases issued by all party fractions 
represented in the Bundestag were identi-
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debates on the topics identified;9 and 
also, though without any claim to ex-
haustive coverage, speeches delivered 
by and interviews with leading func-
tionaries of the executive branch of 
government.10 This material was then 
analysed in accordance with the 
Grounded Theory approach (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967) modified by recent 
works of Meuser and Nagel (2005), 
                                                                  
                                                      
fied via press offices, party archives, and 
the MPs’ home pages for the period from 
the beginning of 2000 to the end of August 
2007. This search produced 272 relevant 
documents. 53 documents connected in 
some way with the work of the two bodies, 
and these were the main documents used 
for the analysis. 
9 The following nine parliamentary debates 
from the 2001-2008 period were selected: 
five debates on stem cell research 
(30.01.2002, 25.04.2002, 2.12.2004, 
14.02.2008, and 11.04.2008), all of which 
were related to the struggle over the law on 
this subject; two debates on cloning 
(20.02.2003 and 16.10.2003), which took 
place in the context of attempts to ban 
cloning via the United Nations; and two 
debates on PGD (14.12.2001 and 
17.03.2005), both of which took place be-
cause the FDP had introduced draft legisla-
tion on the issue. These nine plenary de-
bates lasted in total for 15 hours, and 176 
speeches were delivered. The written re-
cord, in the form of the Bundestag’s steno-
graphic transcript, is approximately 250 
pages long in total. In these 250 pages 
there are 24 references to documents pro-
duced by the ethics councils. 
10 This material was identified by using the 
home pages of the ministries and the Lex-
isNexis data bank. 10 relevant speeches 
were found, including speeches delivered 
by Chancellor Schröder on the occasions of 
the setting up and reconstitution of the 
National Ethics Council (8.6.2001 and 
23.6.2005), to the “atatech” scientific con-
ference (30.9.2003), and to the Fraunhofer 
Society (22.10.2003); the speech delivered 
by the Minister of Justice, Brigitte Zypries, 
to a forum organised by the Humboldt 
University (Berlin) (29.10.2003); and other 
speeches by the Minister for Research, 
Edelgard Bulmahn, and the Minister of 
Health, Ulla Schmidt. I also examined 9 
relevant interviews with these leading poli-
ticians published in national newspapers 
and magazines (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Die Zeit, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, Tagesspiegel, Der 
Spiegel). 
with the goal of drawing up a list of 
types of political reference to expertise 
(on this point, see Kelle/Kluge 1999). I 
have explained my way of constructing 
types, and set out in detail the findings 
of my investigation, elsewhere (Bogner 
2011). In the present context, the main 
point of interest is what these refer-
ences reveal about how politicians 
deal with disagreement among ex-
perts. 
In the framework of the empirical 
analysis, one notices that references 
by politicians to ethics expertise are 
first and foremost formal in nature, 
and also that they serve to express 
recognition and acknowledgment of 
disagreement among experts.11 This 
means that most of the time, MPs and 
leading functionaries do not comment 
on specific, substantive aspects of the 
experts’ views, but welcome in very 
general terms the range of views as an 
enrichment of political debate. They do 
not say anything about either the es-
sential content or the majority and 
minority positions revealed. Individual 
ethical arguments put forward and 
points of view taken within the bodies 
are not acknowledged, and neither are 
any of the concrete positions adopted 
or recommendations for action (even 
though these may coincide with the 
politician’s own position). What is ac-
knowledged is the differentiated na-
ture and variety of the experts’ argu-
ments, which are expressed in an 
agreement to disagree that is ex-
plained and is set out in such a way 
that it can easily be followed by the 
reader. It seems clear that the sub-
 
11 This section gives an outline of the most 
interesting and dominant types of political 
references to ethics expertise. Apart from 
formal references there are other types 
which, in fact, focus on the specific con-
tents of ethics expertise in different re-
spects. There are references using expertise 
in a selective manner to consolidate al-
ready existing political aims (“instrumental 
reference”). Another less frequent type 
employs – at least rhetorically – certain 
arguments from the expertise (“analytical 
reference”). 
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stance of the matter is seen as less 
important than the fact that the 
fndings have been published. Accord-
ingly, the statements taken in their 
entirety are welcomed as important 
bases for political decisionmaking. A 
good example of this can be found in 
the following quotation from Andrea 
Fischer, the former Minister of Health. 
Fischer was known to be critical of 
embryo research, but she commented 
positively on the relatively contrary 
findings on the subject of the National 
Ethics Council and the Commission of 
Enquiry: 
“The two votes by the Study Commission 
and the Ethics Council will enrich our par-
liamentary discussions. In January, parlia-
ment must come to a decision and pass 
legislation to regulate these matters.” (An-
drea Fischer, B90/Grüne, Press release 
2.12.2001)  
It is sometimes emphasised that be-
cause the reports produced by these 
advisory bodies are so well structured 
and succeed in clarifying the concepts 
involved, they furnish a good basis for 
the important decisions that have to be 
taken. In the present context, though, 
the main point to be made concerns 
the political interpretation of dis-
agreement among experts. And what 
one notices here is that this disagree-
ment is not criticised because it means 
an absence of agreement, but rather 
read as the expression of a genuine 
discourse between the experts which 
provides an authentic reflection of the 
range of views existing in society. 
When the reports are read in this way, 
they are seen as proof that democracy 
is functioning well and, in the end, as 
enriching politics. Disagreement 
among experts becomes a guarantee of 
the credibility of the body involved and 
of the political system that has turned 
to these experts for their advice. One 
can see these aspects very clearly ex-
pressed in a speech delivered by Chan-
cellor Gerhard Schröder at the begin-
ning of the National Ethics Council’s 
public session on 23 September 2004: 
“I have not seen any disadvantage in the 
fact that different positions exist within the 
Ethics Council and also emerge in public, 
in other words that here [....], unlike in 
parliament, where we have to vote, it is 
more a matter of making clear what issues 
are at stake, and also making it clear that 
the different approaches one can see in 
society are also, naturally enough, present 
in the National Ethics Council. I regard this 
as a positive aspect of the matter and not, 
contrary to claims I have sometimes heard, 
a sign of a failure to take the necessary 
decisions [....] And, incidentally, you have 
rendered a great service by showing that it 
was quite wrong to suppose, as some ob-
servers did, that the members of the Ethics 
Council were invited to participate in order 
to produce the results the government 
wanted. I think you have refuted this claim, 
which is sometimes made, in a very im-
pressive way.” (Gerhard Schröder, speech 
to the National Ethics Council 
23.09.2004)12 
What this means is that in the political 
discourse, the main goal is not to 
elaborate one’s own position on the 
basis of the experts’ vote, as a way of 
bolstering one’s own view within the 
political spectrum by making it appear 
superior to all other opinions. The 
“essence”, the specific content of the 
position taken by the experts, is not 
predominantly important;13 much 
more important seems to be its “exis-
tence”, the fact that now, on the basis 
of an informed disagreement between 
experts, politicans can act – indeed, 
that they must. One can see this being 
expressed in the following passage, in 
which an MP uses the statements on 
prenatal diagnosis issued by the two 
councils as an opportunity to call for a 
political decision: 
“We can now read the comprehensive final 
report on this topic (PGD, A.B.) produced 
by the Commission of Enquiry from the last 
parliamentary term, and we also have the 
statement issued by the National Ethics 
Council. The arguments for and against 
                                                       
12 http://www.ethikrat.org/dateien/pdf/-
Wortprotokoll_2004-09-23.pdf  
13 However, the content may be of a certain 
interest to the public, as one of the anony-
mous reviewers noted. In fact, the public 
(as a third player in this game) could check 
whether politicians just ignore the content 
or come to a decision that can be legiti-
mised with regard to the ethical recom-
mendations. 
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have been carefully examined. This means 
that the preparatory work needed for a 
decision has been completed. Now, each 
one of us must have the courage to vote on 
the issue.” (Detlev Parr, FDP, Bundestag 
debate 20.02.2003, Prot. 15/28, p. 2143) 
Here too, disagreement among experts 
is interpreted as something that en-
riches the political debate, but also – 
and significantly – as something that 
says to politicans, in no uncertain 
terms, that they must now take a deci-
sion. Attention is drawn to the fact that 
the opinions of experts who disagree 
with one another have been presented, 
and the ethical stalemate is interpreted 
as the starting signal for a decision 
politicans must take on their own – 
which makes it genuinely political. 
This means that when formal reference 
is made to ethics expertise, a credible 
moment for a political decision has 
quietly arrived. Political decisions are 
necessary and legitimate once the ex-
perts have spoken, and – because 
there is no consensus – they have spo-
ken without pressurising politicians to 
act in any particular way. 
If we look at this the other way round, 
the symbolic aspect of expert knowl-
edge means that it is not acceptable to 
anticipate the views of the experts po-
litically. If political initiatives are taken 
before the ethics experts’ consulta-
tions have been concluded and their 
findings made public, a negative view 
of this will be taken in political circles. 
One example of such an initiative was 
the draft legislation designed to regu-
late PGD introduced by the FDP at the 
end of 2001, before either the Study 
Commission or the National Ethics 
Council had concluded their consulta-
tions on the subject. Across the politi-
cal spectrum, from the CDU/CSU to the 
Greens, the verdict was that this was 
an illegitimate anticipation of politics – 
even though the ethical arguments 
were already well known at that 
stage.14  
                                                       
                                                                 
14 The PGD procedure has been technically 
possible since 1990, though it was only in 
In a number of ways, therefore, dis-
agreement among experts turns out to 
be not a weakness but rather a distin-
guishing feature of the quality of ethi-
cal advice. For one thing, disagree-
ment among experts, which is the rule 
rather than the exception in ethicised 
discourses, is a sign of the authenticity 
of ethical expert discourse. Experts 
participating in disputes about bio-
medicine are no different from the rest 
of society – they are unable to agree. 
In this respect, the ethics councils can 
be seen as a gauge of the societal and 
political acceptability of disagreement: 
they exist because permanent dissent 
is considered to be legitimate in prin-
ciple. The way ethics councils negoti-
ate controversial issues is only com-
prehensible against the background of 
a generalised expectation of disagree-
ment. Another indication of the quality 
of this disagreement is the fact that 
this is not a case of disagreement for 
disagreement’s sake, but the outcome 
of a long process of internal efforts to 
draw up a structured position. This 
well-ordered disagreement is an ex-
pression of civilised methods of com-
munication, and can therefore be read 
as a general indication of the civilising 
effects of ethical deliberation. This 
accounts for the hope that ethics 
councils may prove to be model labo-
ratories for socially acceptable ways of 
dealing with value conflicts. The third 
element is the way in which this refer-
ence to the range of views held by ex-
perts underlines the autonomy of po-
litical action. Disagreement among 
experts makes it abundantly clear, 
once again, that politicians are free to 
choose any of the options made avail-
able to them within the frame of ethics 
expertise. Disagreement among ex-
perts thus represents a (limited) range 
of well-founded options, and so pro-
 
2000 that a broader discussion emerged in 
Germany following a relatively liberal 
statement on the subject issued by the 
Bundesärztekammer, the professional or-
ganisation of German doctors (see also 
Kollek 2000). 
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vides a frame for legitimate political 
decisionmaking. Disagreement simul-
taneously makes it symbolically clear 
that the time for a genuinely political 
decision has now arrived. 
6 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the ethi-
cisation of technology controversies 
presents clearly identifiable opportuni-
ties for the legitimation of political 
action. This ethicisation is one expres-
sion of a wave of ethics which, as Nik-
las Luhmann (1990: 10-17) once ob-
served ironically, has appeared with 
considerable regularity at the end of 
every century ever since the invention 
of printing. We are currently con-
fronted with controversies within bio-
medicine which are being conducted in 
ethical terms and concepts. I have ar-
gued that this ethicisation indicates 
that there has been a change in the 
significance of disagreement: where 
questions of value are concerned ir-
resolvable, permanent disagreement is 
considered legitimate, but this is not 
the case for questions of risk. The 
analysis showed, via an examination of 
the revaluation of participatory proce-
dures and the subjectification of the 
rationality of political decisions, that 
this is of considerable significance for 
the governance of technology contro-
versies. It also showed that there has 
been a change in the form of expertise: 
in the context of its political organisa-
tion, ethics expertise is becoming a 
product that must be negotiated be-
tween representatives of different dis-
ciplines and worldviews. 
To avoid misunderstandings: Ethicisa-
tion refers to the fact that presently, 
the keywords, concepts or distinctions 
provided by the ethical discourse are 
of predominant importance for the 
negotiation of technology controver-
sies. That is, it is not ethics as an aca-
demic discipline; rather it is ethics in a 
popularised (some philosophers would 
say: degenerated) version, which be-
comes influential for the framing of the 
public debate.15 One could argue that 
such a notion of ethicisation blurs the 
boundaries between ethicisation and 
moralisation, but I have stressed that 
this difference is clearly indicated by 
the predominance of dissent and con-
sent, respectively. Furthermore, there 
is a complex interdependency of ethi-
cisation and the predominance of dis-
sent. Talking ethics in technology con-
troversies renders dissent legitimate. 
But that’s only one face of the coin. 
From a sociological point of view it is 
just as well the other way round. Only 
if dissenters acknowledge dissent to be 
legitimate they can lead an ethically 
framed discourse on technology. Tak-
ing this argument a step further, from 
a social theoretical standpoint the 
ethicisation of technology controver-
sies can be taken as an indication for 
the revaluation of heterogeneity, di-
vergence and disagreement in modern 
societies, i.e. for an increasing need to 
deal with a balanced disorder instead 
of the futile strive to establish a strong 
order (Willke 2003). Thus, we can un-
derstand the phenomenon of ethicisa-
tion as an indicator that pluralistic 
societies start to take pluralism seri-
ously. 
The empirical analysis of this contribu-
tion focused on the question of the 
political utilisation of expert knowl-
edge, i.e. how politics deals with dis-
agreement among experts. In the end, 
the question that is of interest to a 
sociologist is whether and in what 
form the change in the legitimacy of 
disagreement (which has only been set 
out here in theoretical terms) affects 
the level at which ethical questions are 
negotiated politically. By means of an 
examination of a range of different 
materials (parliamentary debates, 
press releases, speeches, interviews) 
the analysis showed that political ref-
erences to ethics expertise are domi-
nated by a form which quite clearly 
                                                       
15 Not even in ethics councils academic 
ethics play a major role, as I have shown 
elsewhere (Bogner 2009). 
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expresses a recognition and apprecia-
tion of disagreement between experts 
– at least in Germany (for a compari-
son with Austria see Bogner 2007). 
Votes split along many different axes 
are read as an authentic reflection of a 
pluralism that actually exists in soci-
ety. It is not individual ethical posi-
tions, but the range of opinions as 
such that is welcomed as an enrich-
ment of politics. It is seen to be ex-
tremely important that the experts’ 
votes should be made available to po-
litical decisionmakers, but the precise 
content of these positions is not par-
ticularly important. In this sense, dis-
agreement between experts is under-
stood as the prelude to a fundamental 
political debate in which one of the 
main ways of generating legitimation 
is via the quality of the procedure (re-
laxation of party discipline, decisions 
made according to the individual’s 
conscience). In this connection, the 
significance attached to ethics exper-
tise is primarily symbolic: it establishes 
the legitimate frame of political action, 
and the moment of its publication 
marks a credible point at which a deci-
sion has to be taken. Deliberations 
about the ethical point at issue have 
shown that there is no point hoping 
for consensual solutions, so the dis-
agreement among the experts repre-
sents a decree to the effect that a po-
litical decision must now be taken. 
There is no way in which disagreement 
among experts determines the political 
decision, but it is constitutive of the 
political sphere’s claim to be acting 
autonomously. 
Unlike in controversies about risk, in 
this situation normative insecurity and 
a failure to reach consensus should 
not be seen as endangering the role of 
science as a major resource and basis 
for decision-making. On the contrary, 
political action seems to be possible 
precisely on this basis of a discursively 
stabilised disagreement. To overstate 
the case slightly: disagreement among 
experts is not the problem for politics, 
it is the solution. Politicians can act 
thanks to the disagreement among 
experts, not in spite of it. This does not 
just mean that irresolvable disagree-
ment forces politicians to find com-
promises. It means more than this – 
that political action can use a positive 
reference to this very disagreement 
among experts in order to legitimise 
itself. It is the political acknowledg-
ment of disagreement itself that ren-
ders politics as a process of parliamen-
tary decision-making visible once 
again. This acknowledgment thus be-
comes a stabilising element which 
serves to mark the dividing line be-
tween expertise and politics. 
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